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COERCIVE PATENT PACKAGE LICENSING-
THE NEED FOR A RULE OF REASON
When examining the law of patents, one may be struck by the image
of an independent artisan-inventor forging this country's technological
progress. Indeed, patents historically have played a valuable role in
stimulating technological development; moreover, when properly aligned
with the various antitrust statutes, the patent law also can be a positive
force in promoting competition.1 However, like the image of the
inventor, the compatibility between the antitrust and patent laws is
more mythical than real.2 Coercive package licensing of patents presents
a classic example of this conflict.
A patent is a 17-year, constitutionally mandated3 grant of Congress
which confers upon the grantee a monopoly in his invention.4 Under-
lying the invocation of the patent protection are several policy con-
siderations. First, the guarantee of a monopoly provides the inventor
with incentive to invest the time, money and energy essential to the
discovery or creation of new technology. Second, patent protection
encourages dissemination and exchange of technology which otherwise
might remain sequestered as a trade secret. Finally, a patent possesses
1. See generally Frost, Patents and Antitrust Laws-Thoughts on Competitive Prin-
ciple and Application to Certain Topics, 10 ANTITRusT BULL. 315 (1964); Turner, Patents,
Antitrust, and Innovation, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 277 (1967).
2. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
452 (1945) noted the potential conflict between the essential roles which the antitrust
and the patent law play in the functioning of our capitalistic economy. He recognized
... the fundamental problem of accommodating the provisions of the patent
laws to those of the anti-trust statutes. Basically these are opposed in policy,
the one granting rights of monopoly, the other forbidding monopolistic
activities. The patent legislation presents a special case, the anti-trust legis-
lation the nation's general policy. Whether the one or the other is wise is
not for us to determine. But their accommodation is one we must make,
within the limits allowed to the judicial function, when the issue is presented.
3. U. S. CONsr. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
4. The present patent law is contained in Title 35 of the United States Code, and
provides in part that:
Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns,
for the term of seventeen years ... of the right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
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some attributes of personal property and therefore vests the owner
with the rights of exclusion,5 suppression, or non-use;" additionally,
ownership affords the patentee the privilege of licensing others to use
his invention.7
In contrast, the antitrust laws seek to prevent the growth of monopoly
power and to inhibit business practices which unduly restrain trade.'
Rather than proscribing specific types of conduct, the statutes merely
established broad general policies, leaving the courts to fashion appro-
priate rules for specific activities.9
In the context of an overall economic model, the broad purpose of
the patent scheme-stimulating technological advances-is compatible
with the basic aims of the antitrust law-promoting competition-but
the specific methods of achieving these ends are potentially discordant.
The antitrust statutes, while seeking to enhance competition, necessarily
5. This concept is reinforced by the patent law, which provides that "patents
shall have the attributes of personal property." Id. § 261. Justice Holmes described it as
"[plroperty carried to the highest degree of abstraction-a right in rem to exclude a
physical object or content." 1 Hotws-PoL ocK Lzrrms 53 (Howe 2d ed. 1961).
6. See, e.g., Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co, 210 U.S. 405, 429(1908).
7. The patent law provides: "Applications for patent, patents, or any interest there-
in, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or
his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive
right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of
the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
8. The pertinent antitrust laws are: (a) The Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970),
declaring illegal "[elvery contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce . . ."; (b) The Sherman Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. S 2 (1970), declaring illegal
any act which constitutes a monopolization, attempt to monopolize, or combination or
conspiracy to monopolize trade or commerce; (c) The Clayton Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1970), proscribing any transaction in the form of a sale, lease or contract in goods (not
services) which is conditioned upon the purchaser agreeing not to deal with the seller's
(lessor's) competitor. Such conduct as concerted refusals to deal, exclusive dealings and
tying arrangements fall within the province of this statute. As with the Sherman Act
sections 1 and 2, there must be a showing of anticompetitive impact-a substantial lessen-
ing of competition or a tendency to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1970); (d) The Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)
(1970), giving the FTC regulatory power to prevent use of "unfair methods of compe-
tition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.'
9. In determining the specific types of conduct which are violative of the antitrust
law the courts have drawn a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints
and thus have seized upon certain conduct which is deemed to be unreasonable per se.
Per se violations, in turn, obviate any need to look beyond the conduct itself to de-
termine whether the activity is justified or otherwise defensible. See generally C. Hius,
ANimRusr ADVISER 7-25 (1971); C. KAYSEN & D. Tum,, ANra'RuST PoLIcY 142-79
(1965); A. NEAr, THE ANrnRSTr LAws OF THE U.S.A. 1-20 (2d ed. 1970).
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prevent the aggregation of market power which might restrain com-
petition artificially. Conversely, the patent monopoly creates just such
an artificial restraint. In an effort to resolve this conflict, judicially-
created interfaces have evolved. 10 Of particular concern is the exploi-
tation involved in the sale or assignment of a particularly desirable
patent when conditions are placed upon its assignment. This practice,
which generally takes the form of package licensing, conditions the
use of the desirable patent upon the licensing of another, usually, non-
essential patent owned by the patentee."
PACKAGE LICENSING OF PATENTS-JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
Package licensing will escape judicial sanction where the licensee is
able to obtain the patents individually or in a package, and questions of
illegality arise only when the patents are coercively tied.12 The requisite
10. Some of the areas treated by the courts are: price restricted licenses, United
States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); cross-licensing, United States v. Line Ma-
terial Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); use restricted licenses, General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938); patent settlements, Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); and patent accumulations, United States v. Hartford-Em-
pire Co., 323 U.S. 386 (1945). See generally Comment, The Patent Antitrust Balance:
Proposals for Change, 17 ViLL. L. REv. 463 (1972). The reconciliation of patent and anti-
trust laws is an ongoing process. Some writers have argued that there is a basic theo-
retical compatibility between these two bodies of law obviating a need for continuous
and close judicial scrutiny, but the courts seem inclined to disagree. See generally Folk,
The Relation of Patents to the Antitrust Laws, 13 LAW & CONTaMP'. PROB. 278 (1948);
Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 76
(1962).
11. See, e.g., Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D.
Ill. 1965); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1
(D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 497 (1964). The package license agreement commonly is
accompanied by percent-of-sales royalty terms, whereby the royalty is measured as a
percentage of the total sales of the license. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950). Although frequently found together, package licensing and
percent-of-sales royalty arrangements involve separate patent misuse questions. Percent
of total sales royalty provisions were recently upheld as a valid counting device in
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), as long as the
agreement is reached as a matter of negotiation and convenience. Only where the royalty
base is coerced is there a patent misuse. Even where there is no extension of the royalty
base to products not using the patent's teaching, there may be the problem raised in
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). In Brulotte, the license provided for the pay-
ment of royalties after, as well as before, the expiration date of the patent. Such an
arrangement was condemned as an unlawful use of the patent's leverage to extend the
monopoly power beyond the scope of the patent.
12. See generally Adams, The Legality of Compulsory Package Licensing of Patents,
12 ANuTRUST BULL. 773 (1967).
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coercion may be evidenced by a refusal to deal 3 or simply by the li-
censee's lack of available alternatives.14 Courts have subjected coerced
tying, in connection with package licensing, to the same proscriptive
rules which are applied to other tying arrangements.
The Supreme Court defined tying arrangements in Times Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States'5 as (1) the coerced purchase of (2)
a dominant tying product and (3) a distinct tied product with (4)
resultant anticompetitive injury."- Where these four conditions coalesce,
such arrangements are deemed to be "unreasonable per se," 17 thus elim-
inating any need for an elaborate economic analysis or inquiry con-
cerning reasonableness or possible justification.' 8 As recendy as 1969,
the Court reaffirmed its disinclination to look beyond the fact of a
coerced tying arrangement, 9 and Justice Frankfurter's conclusion in
Standard Oil of California v. United States'0 that "[t]ying agreements
serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition," re-
mains typical of the Court's general approach.
The Dominant Tying Product
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,21 the Court ex-
plained and broadened the meaning of the dominant tying product-
the second element in the Times-Picayune formula. The formula was
interpreted as requiring merely "sufficient economic power to im-
pose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied prod-
13. See, e.g., Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc, 367 F.2d 678
(6th Cir. 1966); American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
14. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 388 F.2d 25 (1967).
15. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
16. Id. at 608-10.
17. In an earlier opinion, the Court in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396 (1947) authoritatively clothed tying arrangements in a per se rule by
stating that "... it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market."
18. Cf. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962): "[Ilt should seldom
be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a full scale factual inquiry into the scope
of the relevant market for the tying product and into the corollary problem of the
seller's percentage share of that market." As to the effect of a per se rule of illegality
vis a vis price-fixing agreements, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940).
19. Forter Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
20. 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
21. 356U.. 1 (1958).
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uct ... ." 22 United States v. Loew's Inc. 23 further expanded the dom-
inance test, holding that actual market power need not be shown, but
could be presumed from the tying product's uniqueness or desirability
to consumers.2 Although Loew's involved the tying of copyrighted
motion picture films, dicta indicates that the Court would consider
patents sufficiently similar to merit identical treatment:
The requisite economic power is presumed when the tying prod-
uct is patented or copyrighted.... Since one of the objectives of
the patent laws is to reward uniqueness .... the existence of a valid
patent on the tying product, without more, establishes a distinc-
tiveness sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement involv-
ing the patented product would have anticompetitive conse-
quences.2 5
Thus, where patent tying is involved, a showing of dominance is
unnecessary; the uniqueness of the patent will satisfy the requirement
of dominance, and the resultant anticompetitive injury will be pre-
sumed.
Such a result was presaged by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,26 which
rendered a sweeping per se condemnation of coercive package licensing
of patents. The court failed, however, to examine the nature of the
patents involved28-a factor which apparently was not deemed material
by the court in its application of the per se rule.
Four years after the opinion in Loew's, however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in International Manufacturing Co. v.
Landon, Inc., 29 distinguished American Securit on the basis of the
nature of the patents involved; Landon involved blocking pat-
ents (patents which are so interrelated that they could be marketed
22. Id. at 11.
23. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id. at 45-46.
26. 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
27. "Whatever may be the asserted reason or justification of the patent owner, if he
compels a licensee to accept a package of patents or none at all, he employs one patent
as a lever to compel the acceptance of a license under another. Equity will not counte-
nance such a result." 268 F.2d at 777.
28. 'We point out that not a single one of the patents ... is in the record before us."
Id. at 776.




successfully only when used together), whereas American Securit
was cited as involving competing patents (patents which compete with
each other in the same relevant market).30 Tying of competing patents
in one package clearly violates the antitrust purpose of enhancing com-
petition, but blocking patents were viewed by the Landon court as
compatible with the competitive thrust of the antitrust laws since, prac-
tically, the fruits of neither patent could be marketed without the
other. From an economic standpoint, tying the two patents was found
to be justified. The Landon court's attempt to distinguish American
30. Patents may be categorized on the basis of their relationship with each other-
blocking, competing, and complimentary. These relationships are often crucial in de-
termining whether the patentee has exceeded the bounds of his monopoly grant and
thereby misused his patent. A blocked patent is one whose production and use would
infringe at least in part upon a prior, unexpired patent. The common situation arises
when there is both a basic patent, and a subsequent refinement or variation which is
sufficiently novel to be patentable. Since the privilege given under the patent law is only
a negative "right to exclude others from making, using, or selling," 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1970), and not an affirmative right to make, use, or sell, the patentee cannot use the
improvement to the extent that a prior patent would be infringed. Neither can the prior
patentee or his assigns use the improvement or adaptation of the basic patent. Under
such circumstances, the patents are said to be blocking. The rule for determining
whether patents are blocking is a pragmatic standard of marketability-can one patent
be successfully marketed without the other? In International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc,
336 F.2d 723 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965), the two patents in question-one
covering devices for skimming and filtering swimming pool water and the other for
vacuuming the pool-were found sufficiently blocking so that "[n]o commercially
feasible device could be manufactured under one of the patents without infringing the
other." Id. at 720. Presumably, no one would either manufacture, sell or use the basic
swimming pool system without both devices-one to purify the water itself and remoye
debris from the water's surface and the other to clean the sides and bottom of the pool.
Competing patents, on the other hand, are ones whose grants cover the same or similar
process or product, but which can be arrived at by different patentable methods. A com-
peting patent situation exists where there is competition between the processes or prod-
ucts flowing from the patents, and should necessarily be measured in terms of relevant
market power of each resultant process or product. An analysis of market power, how-
ever, is a complex and inexact endeavor at best. See P. AREEDA, A~nT-usr ANAL.YsIs
135 (1967). For this apparent reason, the courts have used the concept of competing
patents thus far only as a means for distinguishing blocking patents, the latter being set
aside for special consideration.
Complimentary patents technically exist only where one patent is commercially useless
without the other. However, since a patent generally will not be granted if the inven-
tion has no utility, this situation is rare. Courts have instead used the term to indicate
several patents, each of which is valid and non-blocking, but which can also be com-
bined to form a distinct, salable product or process. See generally Goller, Competing,
Complimentary and Blocking Patents: Their Role in Determining Antitrust Violations
in the Areas of Cross-Licensing, Patent Pooling and Package Licensing, 50 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 723 (1968).
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Securit, however, leaves an unresolved conflict among the circuits 1
-a conflict which has been further compounded in other recent deci-
•sions. The Sixth Circuit,3 2 for example, has recognized the blocking
patent exception of Landon,33 whereas the Seventh Circuit 3 has aligned
itself with the Third Circuit's per se approach of American Securit.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to confront directly the ques-
tion of coercive package licensing of patents, its dictum in Loe&s is
generally considered so persuasive, at least where non-blocking patents
are involved, that most litigants do not vigorously contest the point.
The protracted Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.35 liti-
gation is illustrative. There, the district court found patent misuse from
the patentee's coercive package licensing as well as from its percent-
of-sales royalty base formula. The patent packaging was analyzed as
a standard tying arrangement, and both practices were enjoined. 6 On
31. The distinction made by the Landon court indicates that it viewed American
Securit as involving competing patents. Landon thus must have construed American
Securit as leaving open the question of blocking patents; but a close reading of the case
does not sustain such a conclusion. Rather, the American Securit decision appears to
stand for a blanket condemnation of all patent tying arrangements. In one respect this
faulty distinction may have created more an illusion of a controversy than a real one.
The Landon court, citing the Times-Picayune requirement that there be two distinct
products, argued persuasively that blocking patents may reasonably be considered to
constitute only a single distinct product. The advantage of this approach is obvious-
there is simply no tying to be proscribed.
32. Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.
1966).
33. In Rocform, however, the absence of a termination clause in the licensing agree-
ment was considered a patent misuse under the theory that the patentee was extending the
payments beyond the life of the patent. In addition to the general equitable remedies of
compulsory patent licensing and injunction against future antitrust violations, the doctrine
of patent misuse has been developed as an equitable remedy to deter extensions of the
patent monopoly beyond the scope of that deemed necessary, as a matter of public policy
to spur invention. See generally Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement
Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 76 (1962).
When a court finds that a patent has been misused, the patentee will be denied relief
in a patent infringement suit. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352
U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942);
Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 171 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1948). Moreover, denial
of relief also may result from a misuse which contravenes the antitrust law. Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continental Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Sylvania Ind. Corp. v. Visking
Corp., 132 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1943). Although a finding of a patent misuse does not
result in permanent forfeiture of the patent, it does present an absolute defense to an
infringement action by the patentee.
34. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967).
35. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
36. It is noteworthy that here the coercion was not an "all or none" refusal to deal,
but an offer of more favorable terms for the package than for any single patent or
,754
PACKAGE LICENSING
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that coerced patent packag-
ing was a "misuse per se." 37 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the pat-
entee did not challenge that aspect of the decision;38 there was, from
the record, little doubt in the minds of Court or counsel that coercive
packaging of patents would, if challenged, be found an unjustifiable
patent misuse.
Thus, it can be concluded that coercive patent packaging is deemed
to be unreasonable per se as a form of tying arrangement. The courts
will not look to the nature of the patents except in a few jurisdictions
where a narrow exception is indulged for patents which are "blocking"
and are commercially useless unless jointly exploited. As a consequence,
no inquiry is made into the reasons or justifications for package licens-
ing or the potential anticompetitive impact. Rather, the courts seem
satisfied with Justice Frankfurter's rationalization that, since such tying
"serve[s] hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion," - it should necessarily fall. This formulation has merit in situa-
tions where a unique or commercially dominant item is tied to a distinct
produt,40 because anticompetitive restraints almost invariably will ensue
in the market of the tied product. But the same result does not neces-
sarily follow where the tied item is a patent. In some instances, it is
possible that countervailing interests will outweigh the anticompetitive
impact; moreover, anticompetitive effects may be simply nonexistent.
PACKAGE LICENSING OF PATENTS-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
There are many acceptable reasons for a patentee to elect to grant
a license rather than to exploit the patent himself.41 The patentee also
smaller group of parents offered in the package. The court found such a practice to be
economic coercion just as repugnant as the refusal to deal. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (ND. IMI. 1965).
37. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25, 34 (7th Cir. 1967).
38. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
39. Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
40. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
41. A patentee may be willing to exchange patent royalties for a license grant because
he lacks adequate production capacity to meet the potential market demand; or because
he wishes to discourage others from "inventing around" his patent by granting them a
license; or, because he is unwilling or unable to assume the risk of exploiting a new
market by himself. He may also be motivated by doubt of the validity or coverage of
the patent. See generally Donnem, The Antitrust Attack on Restrictive Patent License
Provisions, 14 ATrusT BusL. 749 (1969); Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation
of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yx.x LJ. 267 (1966).
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may have reasonable justification for requiring a package licensing
agreement. The most obvious reasons, however, are often the most
blatantly anticompetitive and fall, rightfully, within the blanket con-
demnation of tying arrangements. It is submitted, however, that at
least two general fact situations present common instances where pack-
age licensing is justifiable. Although it is recognized that most package
licensing schemes are inherently harmful, the existence of sound eco-
nomic bases for other uses of package licensing should militate against
automatic proscription by mere reference to per se reasoning, and courts
should examine varying fact situations individually.
Patents Competing with the Tied Patent
Suppose that A, an inventor, owns two patents: Y, a dominant highly
desirable and commercially successful patent, and X1 a distinct patent,
also commercially useful. B, another inventor, owns patent X2, which
competes with patent X1. Assume X1 and X2, although different patents,
are nevertheless competitive and equally interchangeable by a manufac-
turer, who desires a license under either patent, but not both. The
manufacturer may undertake a licensing agreement with either A or B,
whichever patentee will give him the better terms. The resulting com-
petition will, predictably, lower the royalty price and inure to the
public benefit in the form of lower ultimate costs. If, however, A uses
his dominant patent, Y, as leverage to coerce the manufacturer into tak-
ing patent X1, to the exclusion of B's patent X2, ultimate costs may be
raised. This kind of tying arrangement exhibits precisely the type of
anticompetitive effects which the courts condemn and it is beyond
question that such attempts to extend the patent monopoly beyond its
intended scope should be proscribed.2
Forcing Licensee to Pay for Useless Patents
Forced licensing of useless patents is clearly abusive, but the resulting
anticompetitive impact is probably de minimus. A licensee will prob-
ably pay no more for a commercially feasible patent which is tied to a
useless patent than he would for the commercially feasible patent alone.
But anticompetitive impact is presumed under the Supreme Court's dic-
42. For instance, the tying of copyrighted films in United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) was similarly proscribed because such arrangements may "force
buyers into giving up the purchase of substitutes for the tied product ... and ... may
destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to the consuming
market. . . ." See Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 (1940).
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tum in Loew's, and, therefore, such a tying arrangement would be per se
illegal.43
Forcing Licensee to Pay for Patents of Questionable Validity
Again, as above, it should be presumed that a licensee would pay no
more for a valid patent plus one of questionable validity than he would
for the valid patent alone. Arguably, there is no anticompetitive impact
in terms of price or exclusion of competitors. Formerly, the doctrine
of licensee estoppel," which prevented the licensee from challenging the
validity of his licensor's patent, could be viewed as an anticompetitive
force in this situation. Thus, in tying a valid patent with one subject
to challenge, the patentee could shift the strength of one patent to an-
other, thereby eliminating a party presumably having expertise con-
cerning the patent and who, therefore, would be exceptionally compe-
tent to challenge the patent's validity." Since the concept of licensee
estoppel, based on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, has been
overruled in principle,46 there is little or no anticompetitive injury
where the tied patent is of questionable validity.
From an economist's standpoint, the tying arrangements in the second
and third situations posited above would not be anticompetitive, 1 but
under the per se rule, both are illegal. This result can be defended on
the basis that such conduct should be disallowed merely because of
its abusive character, irrespective of economic injury. There are, how-
ever, other circumstances where the similarity with other coercive
tying arrangements becomes attenuated and where a finding of illegality
43. Even absent a showing of anticompetitive injury or use of the per se rule, such
conduct may be illegal as "unfair methods of competition ...:' under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1970).
44. This concept originated in Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).
45. See generally Adams, The Legality of Compulsory Package Licensing of Patents,
12 ANnTRusr B=LL. 773, 800 (1967); Comment, The Overruling of the Licensee Estoppel
Doctrine, 48 N.C.L. REv. 391 (1970); Note, Estoppel to Deny Validity-A Slender Reed,
23 N.Y.U. Im'RA. L. Ruv. 237 (1968).
46. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
47. Even in Example #1, there may be no real anticompetitive impact where the
tying and tied product resulting from the patents are complimentary and, because of
market demand, can be sold only in fixed proportion compliments. Professor Bowman,
in his analysis of tied products, invokes a "nuts and bolts" example. If the seller has
dominance over one or the other, and if he uses this as leverage to tie the two products,
the economic power of the tied product will not actually be extended (in terms of the
aggregate price of a nut and bolt), since the profit could have been maximized by simple
monopolistic pricing of the tying product alone. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YaLE LJ. 19 (1957).
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is of dubious utility. In these situations, application of the Times-
Picayune/Loew's standard may be improper.
Patent Packaging of Questionable Commercial Utility
As a matter of rational business conduct, a patentee may require a
single license agreement covering several valid patents which are of
unknown commercial viability. The patents may be interrelated, al-
though not necessarily in a dominant-subservient or blocking relation-
ship. There is conceivably no economic harm in permitting the tying
of such related patents, none of which is dominant,48 as a convenient
commercial expedient. There is no real extension of the patents'
monopoly power, for the patentee surely could charge for each indi-
vidual patent whatever the market would bear. Such an arrangement
could (absent the per se rule) be justified as a valid risk-allocation
device where the risk factor is the future commercial failure of any
or all of the patents. With the percent-of-sales terms, the agreement
would take on many of the attributes of a joint venture.
Commercial Necessity
As previously stated, there are strong policy arguments in favor of
allowing package licensing of blocking patents. The Landon case rec-
ognizes that where no commercially feasible device can be produced
without tying, it is better to have a coercive tying arrangement than to
deny the invention's benefits to the public.49 Coercive tying of patents
also may be supported as an expedient to diminish administrative burdens
on the patentee by avoiding multiplicity of license negotiations, sur-
veillance and enforcement of licensing agreements, and infringement
litigation.50
48. "Dominant", as used herein, means that no particular patent is more desired or
sought after by a prospective licensee than the next.
49. The Landon court made two substantial arguments in support of its reasoning.
First under prior decisions, the concept had developed that an express license under one
patent carries an implied license for any other patent owned by the licensor which would
be infringed by use of the licensed patent. See National Rubber Mach. Co. v. McNeil
Mach. & Eng'r Co., 132 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1942); But see Duval Sulphur & Potash Co.
v. Potash Co. of America, 244 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1957). The other argument is that
blocking patents are not separate, but are a single product. International Mfg. Co. v.
Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965). See
note 31 supra & accompanying text.
50. These arguments, however, would seem at best mere collateral points to support
an already valid package licensing agreement, as their strength derives in part from the
moribund rationale of United States v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926), which
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Moreover, several of the exceptions which have been established for
the tying arrangement's per se restrictions in product cases suggest that
there are justifications which may be useful in patent tying cases. In
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,51 for example, a tying arrange-
ment was held temporarily justifiable for a new business with a highly
uncertain future. Significantly, it was also acknowledged that there may
be instances where the per se rule should bend to other reasonable and
non-anticompetitive business practices involving tying arrangements. 2
In Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co.,35 the Court, ap-
parently impressed by a lack of anticompetitive injury, found that the
defendant's conduct was not coercive because the plaintiff remained
free not to deal in the tying product, as would a prospective licensee
under package licensing. Finally, there is support for the practice of
patent packaging in the related areas of cross-licensinge 4 and patent
settlements.5 5 These economic and legal justifications combine to sug-
gest that patent licensing practices should fall within a rule of reason
analysis rather than a per se condemnation.
CONCLUSION
An accommodation must be reached between the patent law policy
of rewarding inventiveness by granting a monopoly, and the antitrust
policy of prohibiting extensions of this monopoly beyond the patent's
grant. The judicial response to this dilemma, as with most antitrust
questions, can best be viewed as a formulation of an answer along one
of four distinct lines. First, the particular practice could be deemed
so inherently anticompetitive that it is absolutely illegal per se, as in the
horizontal price fixing or territorial division cases.56 Secondly, the prac-
held that a patentee may insist upon those "conditions of sale [which] are normally and
reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly." Id. at 490.
51. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curium, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
52. See Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Heyman, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws-A Re-
appraisal at the Close of the Decade, 14 AunTRusr BULL. 537, 541 (1969).
53. 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
54. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (Cross licensing to pro-
mote efficient production is not unlawful so long as it is not accompanied by price
fixing).
55. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (Settlement of conflicting
patent claims as an alternative to time consuming and expensive litigation is not in
itself illegal).
56. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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tice could be regarded as generally anticompetitive, but warranted under
limited circumstances and, therefore, presumptively illegal per se.57 The
third approach would apply a rule of reason,5 recognizing that almost
any transaction restrains trade and that only practices which restrain
trade unreasonably are to be condemned. The last approach would
state a rule of presumptive legality, holding the practice, absent any
other antitrust violation, to be legal.59
The coercive patent packaging cases have been classsed as presumptively
illegal per se, except for the narrow exception of blocking patents. This
treatment has failed to recognize that there are variants in packaging
schemes for patents that do not exist in other tying arrangements. The
patent packaging question simply does not lend itself to such a mechan-
ical approach. There are likely to be justifications and benefits to patent
packaging which would outweigh any demonstrable economic injury.
Nevertheless, adopting the Loew's dictum, patent packaging is presently
under a more restrictive per se rule than product packaging. Yet most
patent packaging schemes arguably exhibit potential for greater busi-
ness justification and less net anticompetitive impact than product tying
devices.
Such broad-brush application of the per se rule of illegality does not
assist the general public because it may unduly inhibit otherwise valid
and harmless licensing practices, thereby interfering unnecessarily with
the functioning of the patent system. Further, there still remains the
unresolved conflict between the Securit and Landon decisions regarding
the blocking patents exception. The Supreme Court's silence further
clouds the status of coercive patent packaging.
In order to establish a proper balance between the patent and anti-
trust laws (the function of both being the preservation and promotion
of a competitive economic system), the logical response to coerced
patent packaging should be the application of a rule of reason, where
the focus would no longer be just upon the fact of coerced tying and
resultant anticompetitive injury, as in American Securit, but also upon
the countervailing benefits to the public and the business justifications
which together may off-set the economic injury. The per se rule for
tying products is not suitably superimposed upon the unique, and
57. E.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
58. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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invariably more complex patent tying situation. It is submitted that
utilization of the rule of reason as a keystone in any analysis of patent
tying would best serve the need of balancing the interests sought to be
protected by patent and antitrust laws.
